This paper begins by highlighting some key characteristics of the demographic transition and child education and their relation to household poverty status in India as evidenced by our analysis of Census data and those from NSS surveys in 1993-94 and 2004-05. Although total fertility rates have declined for the country as a whole and for all states over the last three censuses of India there is considerable variation by space, by poverty status and by education of women in the household in the two cross sections. Child poverty rates exceed those for the whole population. The number of children in the household depends on the number of women in child-bearing age and their distribution across this age group, female education and per capita monthly expenditure of households as well as by social groups. We find evidence of gender bias in education and argue that for approximately half of India's children the Right to Education Act must involve substantial improvements in the quality of education to be meaningful and reflect the spirit of the RTE law.
Figure 1 here.
We present data on Total Fertility Rates (TFR) for India and its major States in figure 2.
Differences in the levels and change in TFR across States during have been large.
In 1960 Haryana, Bihar and Jharkhand had TFR over 8, while Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Tamil Nadu had TFR of less than 6. Over the 50 years TFR declined in all states.
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka and West Bengal's TFR is nearing 2 while that of Bihar, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh continues to remain high at around 4 with an All India average of 2.9. In 2011 it has declined to 2.6 while the State differences persist.
Decline of TFR between 1991 and 2001 in all states has been impressive. Murthi et.al.(1995) attempt an explanation of the drivers using cross-section data from the pre-reforms period. Table A1 . Three large states, namely, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh have largest concentration of child poverty. Implications for poverty and education policies are enormous. The drop in child poverty between 1993-94 and 2004-05 is impressive. It declined in most states but increased in a few, viz., Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Kerala. This should be a cause for serious concern. Both concentration and rise in the incidence of child poverty have implications for state level and national public policies. We examine the incidence of child poverty at the household level in the next section.
Figure 3 here.
2 See Chaudhri and Jha (2011a) and Census of India 2011, Paper 1 on Population and Growth.
III. Child Poverty, Gender Bias Levels and Change 1993-94 and 2004-05
We divide two large, representative, cross-section datasets (118527 and 108538 households in each) for 1993-94 and 2004-05 respectively into four subgroups according to per capita monthly expenditure (PCME).
3 Households with PCME less than half the absolute poverty line are classified as very poor, those with PCME below the poverty line but more than half of it are considered moderately poor. Those with PCME above the poverty line but less than double of it are considered non poor low consumption group and household with PCME level more than double the poverty line are considered non poor high consumption group. The results are reported in Figure 4 . Statistical differences in the means of each of these subgroups within a cross-section and pairwise comparisons between two cross-sections are significant at 1%. A number of interesting contrasts appear to be relevant for our econometric analysis presented in section VI. The gender bias measured as number of girls per thousand boys is highest among the non-poor high consumption group and is lowest among the moderately poor groups in both the cross-sections, 11 years apart.
Figure 4 here.
The number of children per household is lowest, at less than one, in the non-poor high consumption group and highest, at 2.59, among moderately poor households. Between 1993-94 and 2004 -05 the number of children declined in each of the sub-groups except among the moderately poor where it increased marginally to 2.59 from 2.38. Children to adults ratio, a proxy for dependency rates, was highest among the poor and lowest among the non-poor households, following a monotonic decline in both the cross-sections. Over these eleven years female participation in the labour force increased among the non-poor and moderately poor, but declined among the very poor households. The share of children among the poor is substantially higher than their share in total population. Two drivers, probably re-enforcing inter-generationally as well, resulting in these outcomes are slower demographic transition among the poor and much higher dependency ratios in these households.
IV. Education, Child Labor and Nowhere Children (2004-05)
In this section we discuss participation in school education, child labour and being Nowhere at the state level. The household data, presented in four subgroups in the preceding section, is merged into two, namely, children growing up in poor households and those growing up in non-poor households. The household data, grouped by states, for school education and exclusion from schools is reported in figure 5 . The figure has two segments, one (5P) dealing with children growing up in households below the poverty line and the second (5NP)
representing children growing up in households above the poverty line. 
V. Education and Exclusion: Change Across States (1993-94 to 2004-05)
In Figure 6 we present data, depicting change between 1993-94 and 2004-05 and exclusion in major states of India. In this figure, distinction between children growing up in poverty and the non-poor is subsumed. As can be seen from the figure, change in positive direction is substantial and impressive. All of it cannot be attributed to prosperity. A major public effort to bring excluded children to schools under its Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Education for All, henceforth SSA), with greater emphasis since 2002, has had an important effect. 4 Chaudhri and Jha (2011a) provide details and section VII in this paper contains a summary. Figure 6 here. For earlier decades, AERC (1971), Chaudhri (1996) , Sen (1971) had highlighted this discrepancy and attributed it to dropouts from schools, mainly due to poverty and opportunity cost reasons. 5 The dropouts from schools usually occur near the harvest and sowing seasons in rural areas and comparable employment needs pressures during festive seasons in the urban areas. Data presented above does not include the dropouts from schools and also does not give us any information about the quality of educational experience and its outcomes. We discuss parts of these in section VII.
VI. Results of Estimation-Demographic Transition and the Causal Chain
In Table 1 Table 1 also shows the differences in coefficients and the significance of these differences. Table 1 here.
These results were confirmed using Probit estimation, results of which are reported in Table 2 .
The dependent variable is whether a household has at least one child in the age group 0 to 14 years. As expected the greater the number of females in the childbearing age groups the greater the possibility of the household having at least one child in the age group 0-14. This impact is highest for the age group 26-35 years. As in the case of the OLS estimation the higher the average education of females in the households the lower is the probability of there being a child in the age group 0-14. As expected, the higher the average level of education of females in the household the lower the number of children and the number of children declines with of monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE). However, this effect is non-linear since a quadratic term in MPCE is positive and significant in both samples. SC and ST 6 The differences between the means of all the relevant variables are statistically significant at 1%. Therefore the two samples are not merged and analysed separately. 7 The average level of education of females in the household is defined as (total number of years of education of females in the household)/number of females in the household. households had smaller likelihoods of having a child than 'other' households in 1993-94. In 2004-05 the dummy for SC households was insignificant in whereas that for ST households changed sign and was significant. Muslim households have a higher probability of having at least one child than households in the 'other' category. The higher the share of health expenditures the greater is the probability that the household has a child in the age group 0-14. A dummy for the relatively less well-off sates of Bihar, MP, UP, Orissa and Rajasthan is positive and significant in both time periods. Ceteris paribus, rural households have a lower probability of having a child as compared to urban households. Table 2 also shows the differences in coefficients and the significance of these differences. Table 2 here.
We modelled the probability of a household having one, two, three or more than three children using a multinomial logit model for 1993-94 and 2004-05 NSS sample data, with the base case being having no child. This helps us to understand how sensitive the number of children is to key independent variables. These results are reported in Table 3 . Table 3 here.
The higher the number of females aged 15-25 in the household the greater is the probability of having one child or four children and the lower is the probability of having two or three children. The higher the number of females in the age group 26-35 the lower the probability of having one child. The higher the number of women in this age group the lower was the probability of having two children in 1993-94 but this marginal effect was positive and significant in 2004-05, indicating that over time there is greater tendency to have two children for women in this age group. However, the greater the number of women in the age group 26-35 the greater the probability of having three or more than three children. Further and again as expected, the greater the number of females aged 36-49 in the household the lower the probability of having one or two children and the greater the probability of having three or more children in the household. In both time periods the number of girls aged 5-14 not in school did not have a significant effect on the probability of having one child in the household. In both time periods the higher the number of girls aged 5-14 not in school the greater the probabilities of having two and more children. The higher the level of education of females in the household the greater are the probabilities of having one and two children and the lower the probabilities of having three and more children. The higher the monthly Child poverty, Demographic Transition and Gender Bias in Education in India: Household Data Analysis (1993-04 and 2004-05) ASARC WP 2011/17 9 MPCE the greater are the probabilities of having one child or two children but negative signs on the square terms indicate that these effects fall off with higher MPCE. The higher the MPCE is lower are the probabilities of having 3 or more children but these effects also fall with increasing MPCE. Health share of total expenditure typically has significant but very small effects on the probabilities of having one, two, three or more than three children. The probability that SC households have one child is insignificantly different from households of the 'others' category. The SC dummy is significant and negative in both years for the estimation for two children and for three and more children in 1993- or two children and higher probabilities of having three or more than three children. The dummy for the states of Bihar, MP, UP, Orissa and Rajasthan is negative and significant for the one child and two children cases in both years whereas it is positive and significant for three and more than three children. Households in rural areas have higher probabilities of having one or two children (except for the two child case in 2004-05 where this dummy is negative and significant) and lower probabilities of having three or more children. Table 4 here.
In Table 4 we report on differences in odds ratios of differences across households in the probability of having different number of children. Thus, in 2004-05, poor households had 18.53 % lower odds (as compared to very poor households) of having one child as opposed to no children. These computations reveal that households with lower MPCE had higher odds of having one or more children (as compared to no children) than households with higher MPCE.
This was true for both sample periods. In both sample periods households from backward castes had higher odds of having one or more children (as compared to no children) than households from non-backward caste background. ST households had higher odds of having one or more children in 2004-05 but lower odds in 1993-94. SC households had lower odds of having one or more children (as compared to no children) in both time periods.
In both time periods Muslims had higher odds of having one or children (as opposed to no children) than non Muslim households. The dependency of this odd ratio on the average education of females in the households is also depicted in with lower odds of having one or more children as opposed to no children.
In Table 5 Table 5 here.
In the IV estimation of the number of children in school the instrumented number of children estimated from the first equation is positive and is strongly significant in both years. The higher the dependency ratio the greater is the number of children in school. The bias against sending girls to school gets reflected in the sign (negative) and strong significance of the variable 'number of girls not in school.' The higher the education level of the head the larger the number of children sent to school in 1993-94 but this effect was negative and significant in 2004-05. As expected higher average education of females the greater is the number of children in school. As expected the higher the MPCE the greater is the number of children sent to school but this effect falls off with higher MPCE. The higher the share of health in total expenditure the lower is the number of children sent to school. Ceteris paribus SC, ST 1993-04 and 2004-05) and Muslim households sent fewer children to school. Rural households were more likely to send children to school whereas households in the states of Bihar, MP, UP, Orissa and Rajasthan sent fewer children to school.
VII. Right to Education, Gender and Poverty Sensitive Law
Beginning Gandhi, commenting on a law on untouchability had stated, 'There is no right, but legal'.9
The new law provides fifth, but enforceable child's right to education. This, we believe, is a game changer provided it is implemented in letter and spirit.
The Education Commission Report (GOI 1966) titled, Education and National Development, was the Republic's first comprehensive study of the links between National Development and the foundational role of Education. Naik, who had been member secretary of the commission , summarizes the role of education as stated in the report, ' The new education, in the commission's view, should be based on a deep and widespread study of science and technology; should cultivate a capacity and willingness to work hard and be closely related to productivity; should strengthen social and national integration and help to create a more just and egalitarian social order; should consolidate democracy as a form of government and help us to adopt it as a way of life; and should help us to strive to build social, moral and spiritual values'.
10
'Education is a double-edged sword; while wrong education could lead to social disintegration, the right kind of education can bring about effective national development.
The most effective way of breaking the vicious circle in which we find ourselves at present is to begin an educational reconstruction in a big way. That is why the commission placed the highest emphasis on creation of a national system of education through an educational revolution… If we desire to get out of this vicious circle, create an egalitarian society and an egalitarian education system, we must mount a big offensive on both social and educational fronts.'
11
The commission had correctly identified the elitist character of Indian society.
The RTE law promises to remedy this. However, implementing a national system of education, with a degree of egalitarianism, would be a challenge. The Jamait Ulama-e-Hind is already quoting Article 30 of the Constitution on minorities educational rights and is threatening to challenge it. Others, when asked to accept 25% of students from the deprived sections are not likely to be far behind. 12 These need to be dealt with resolutely but with social sensitivity. Egalitarian society without a level playing field in education would be an illusion. Risks of a dualistic model of education persisting, partly due to elitism but mainly due to the additional cost of providing quality education with a uniform national minimum standard, are serious. Thus cheating the poor with poor quality education may continue.
There shall be no legal remedy or protection against such eventualities.
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VIII. Conclusions
This paper has highlighted some key characteristics of the demographic transition and child education and their relation to household poverty status in India. Total fertility rates have declined for the country as a whole and for all states over the last three censuses of India. The dependency rate was highest among the poor and lowest among the non-poor households, following a monotonic decline in both the cross-sections. The share of children among the poor is substantially higher than their share in total population, i.e., child poverty is higher than poverty in the general population. Two drivers, probably re-enforcing intergenerationally as well, resulting in these outcomes are slower demographic transition among the poor and much higher dependency ratios in these households.
Further, the poor have a larger proportion of children out of school, particularly in the EAG states. There are wide variations across states and across rural and urban areas in the number of children in school, working as child labour and 'nowhere'. The paper also examines the determinants of the number of children in a household. The key determinants are (i) the number and age distribution of women in the child-bearing age groups (ii) average education of these women; and (iii) PCME of the household. Dummies for EAG states are significant as are dummies for social status, particularly Muslims.
We then modeled the decision to send children to school. We find that (i) the higher the average education of females the greater is the number of children in school; (ii) the higher the MPCE the greater is the number of children sen to school but this effect falls off with higher MPCE; and (iii) the higher the share of health in total expenditure the lower is the number of children sent to school. Further, the larger the number of girls in the household the lower the number of children sent to school, exhibiting a gender bias in education. Ceteris paribus SC, ST and Muslim households sent fewer children to school. Rural households were more likely to send children to school whereas households in the EAG states sent fewer children to school. Thus, for accelerating demographic transition in EAG states and among the households in absolute poverty, education, particularly of the girls is the key driver.
Finally, the paper argues that Indian children are faced with a three-tier education system.
The rich are able to get the best quality education whereas middle class children are able to acquire quality education with considerable subsidy from the state. Children from relatively poor families, for whom the SSA is most relevant, typically get poor quality education and exhibit poor educational outcomes. The RTE implementation must explicitly recognize this incipient three-tier education system and pay attention to the quality of education for the poorest if India is to realize its demographic dividend. Potential benefits of equity and inclusive growth as well as population growth stabilization are enormous. 11,207,878 8,033,143 5,035,299 4,834,240 2,328,351 2,251,794 1,518,633 1,146,246 1,136,549 917,175 901,891 840,544 676,732 519,761 284,253 72,321 -224,237 -1,190,650 -3,500 -2,500 -1,500 
